Weary Prospects In Afghanistan
The approach to combat within Afghanistan recently endured rigorous review, but the verdict seems clear. The war policy in Afghanistan has failed. Amongst a significant increase in violence, a corrupt national government exists that has made little to no progress with humanitarian goals. Indeed, the few strides toward ending the eight-year conflict currently amounts to nothing. Consensus between policymakers and military officials provide an ultimatum - operations must take a new approach or America and her allies lose the war. General McChrystal seeks additional troops and support in protecting the people of Afghanistan from the remnants of Taliban and Al Qaeda forces - who have gained significant strength over the past year. General McChrystal particularly seeks to increase the presence of American troops amongst the Afghan people. In other words, General McChrystal seeks to place troops directly in Afghan villages and "look from the inside, outside. Instead of only looking from the outside in." This, according to General McChrystal, “make[s] the insurgents come to us. Make[s] them be the aggressors.”
However admirable the notion, General McChrystal makes a key assumption that may prove fatal to his plan. Additional years within Afghanistan is simply not a viable option, but appears to be the only effective policy moving forward. The political climate within America shifts too much for such tactics to sustain itself. The clarion call from both sides of the political aisle for reform in Afghanistan does not help the sustainability of operations either. Most Americans do not understand the notions of “rugged Afghan terrain,” “thousands of ethnic tribes” or “intricate network of Taliban and Al Qaeda.” Instead, Americans hear the sensational arguments “Afghanistan: Where Empires Go to Die,” the sobering news via troop casualty reports and a smidgen of reality that this conflict has no end in sight. The alternative plan of action touted by opposition to troop increases, however, calls for sending more special operational forces and drones. This approach offers an even weaker strategy.
Utilizing special operational forces and drones simply repeats a strategy, abandoned after the military shift of priority to Iraq. The drone and Special Forces strategy failed due to negligence on the part of military leaders. Before combat operations in Afghanistan began on October 7, 2001, the Secretary of Defense received orders to send special operational forces into Afghanistan. Their mission involved reconnaissance of strategic positions and discussions with tribal leaders within Afghanistan. These discussions specifically sought support from tribal leaders in regards to neutrality or cooperation during the impending conflict. Power distribution once the Taliban were removed from power also served as a very contentious issue. Twenty different different ethnic groups exist within Afghanistan. The four most dominant ethnic groups include: Pashtuns, who comprise 38 percent of the population; Tajiks, 25 percent; Hazara, 19 percent; and Uzbeks, 6 percent. Each group includes tribes, and among the Pashtuns, for instance, as many as thirty exist. The ethnic diversity within Afghanistan created a power vacuum long before even the Soviets invaded. This regional ambiguity poses two problems: long-term stability seems unlikely and the likelihood of a government receiving widespread support in Afghanistan seems remote. One need simply review Afghanistan’s storied past to understand that.
Change in tactical priority, due to perceived Al Qaeda and Taliban instability within Afghanistan, and an increasingly volatile Iraqi combat theater, loosened relations between tribal leaders and military forces. Essentially, the tribal leaders were left to fend for themselves against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The article indicates tribal leader support as essential to furthering coalition goals. Specifically, a shortage in coalition troops lessens the ability to control and monitor remote areas of the country. This is an important issue in Southeast Afghanistan, especially along the Pakistani border, due to increasing levels of violence. With the Pakistani military potentially unable to quell the radical Islamist uprising throughout the region, the situation may worsen.
A partnership between coalition forces and tribal leaders allows for more effective strategy in facilitating regional stability. General McChrystal’s task involves finding a method by which to transition the conflict away from aggressive air strikes and combat to effectively utilizing special operational forces in diplomatic and strategic relationships with tribal leaders. The Special Forces possess the best capacity to effectively engage and win over tribal leaders, but the war effort simply cannot tolerate repeated drone intervention. The strategy does not work and will only create more enemies. General McChrystal’s plan, while not feasible, blows the alternative out of the water.
In sum, Dexter Filkins’ observance of both the Afghan and American people’s impatience and fears are not without cause. America utilized special operational forces before, and left the Afghan people to dry. With a highly contentious American political environment and a voter-base that increasingly grows weary of a conflict against guerrilla groups, the Afghan people lack any guarantees. Ultimately, success or failure relies on a stable country with a functioning government. Neither exists within Afghanistan. The approach to combat within Afghanistan involves so many complexities; indeed, a favorable outcome will involve loss.
